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Distress Morass: Confusing Signals From
California's Courts and Legislature
I. INTRODUCTION
The torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress have been recognized by the California courts for many
years.' In the last ten years, a large body of California case law has
developed concerning the issue of whether an action in tort for
emotional distress arising out of the plaintiff's employment may be
brought, or whether such actions are barred by the workers' com-
pensation provisions of the California Labor Code.2 The controversy
surrounding this issue has become more prominent in recent months
due to certain 1989 California court decisions
3 and legislative acts. 4
This Comment will first give a general overview of California
statutes and case law concerning the conflict between infliction of
emotional distress by an employer and workers' compensation exclu-
1. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussion of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in California), notes 38-60 and accompanying text (discussion of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in California).
2. See infra notes 79-188 and accompanying text (discussion of the conflict between
emotional distress causes of action and the Labor Code). See generally, e.g., Jenkins v. Family
Health Program, 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 262 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1989); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987); Renteria v. County
of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (cases involving emotional distress
arising from employment).
3. See infra notes 132-88 and accompanying text (discussion of 1989 California court
decisions).
4. See infra notes 189-97, 220-28 and accompanying text (discussion of recent legislative
action).
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sivity.5 Next, this Comment will discuss the likely future ramifications
of recent California cases and legislative enactments. 6 Finally, this
Comment will propose legislative and judicial action to ensure that
injured employees are adequately compensated, while preserving the
efficiency of the California workers' compensation system.
7
II. LE AL HISTORY
A. The Statutory Background of Workers' Compensation Law in
California
The constitution of the state of California grants the legislature
the power to create and regulate the workers' compensation system.'
In 1911, the legislature enacted the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which was designed to compensate employees for work-related injury
or death and to create and fund an industrial accident board.9 The
legislature intended to provide injured employees with swift disposi-
tion of their claims. 10
The workers' compensation provisions are contained in the Cali-
fornia Labor Code (hereinafter Labor Code)." Labor Code section
3600 provides that, with very few exceptions, liability exists against
any employer, 12 without regard to negligence, for any employee's"
injury14 or death caused by an incident arising out of the course of
employment.' 5 The Labor Code contains extensive provisions regard-
5. See infra notes 8-30 (discussion of the statutory basis of workers' compensation),
notes 38-68 (discussion of case law concerning the torts of intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress), notes 71-188 (discussion of emotional distress in the area of employment).
6. See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 217-52 and accompanying text.
8. See CAL. CONST. art XIV, § 4.
9. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 399, at 796.
10. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 612 P.2d 948,
953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980). See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1989) (workers'
compensation provisions are to be liberally construed in the employee's favor).
11. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6149 (West 1989).
12. See id. § 3300 (definition of employer).
13. See id. § 3351 (definition of employee).
14. See id. § 3208 ("injury" is defined as "any injury or disease arising out of employ-
ment").
15. Id. § 3600(a). The provisions only apply when: (1) Both the employee and the employer
are subject to the workers' compensation system; (2) the employee is acting within the scope
of employment; (3) the injury is proximately caused by the employment; (4) the injury is not
intentionally self-inflicted; (5) the injury is not a proximate result of the employee's intoxication;
(6) the employee is not injured in the course of the commission of a felonious act; and (7)
the injury does not arise out of an altercation initiated by the employee. Id.
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ing computation of the proper amount of compensation for specific
injuries. 16 The legislature has explicitly stated that courts should
construe the workers' compensation provisions liberally in favor of
providing coverage for injured employees.
17
Section 3602 of the Labor Code, commonly known as the "exclu-
sive remedy provision," prohibits most injured employees from bring-
ing tort claims against their employers by providing that the workers'
compensation system is the exclusive remedy for most on-the-job
injuries.18 The exclusive remedy provision applies to almost all injuries
resulting from employment. The Labor Code includes exceptions to
the exclusive remedy provision for injuries which are proximately
caused by an employer's willful physical assault, 9 or aggravated by
the employer's fraudulent concealment of the nature of the injury.20
Also excepted from the exclusive remedy provision are injuries prox-
imately caused by a defective product manufactured by the employer
and transferred for consideration to a third party for the employee's
use,2' injuries caused by the manufacturer's failure to install man-
datory safety guards on power equipment, z2 and injuries for which
the employer is uninsured, or otherwise fails to take action to secure
payment of the injured employee's workers' compensation claim.
23
The legislature amended much of the workers' compensation system
in 1982, adding the above exceptions to the exclusive remedy provi-
sion.2 4 The reasoning behind the legislature's failure to make claims
16. See id. §§ 4550-855.
17. Id. § 3202 (explicit legislative mandate to liberally construe workers' compensation
provisions).
18. Id. § 3602(a) (exclusive remedy provision).
19. Id. § 3602(b)(1) (exception for physical assaults by the employer).
20. Id. § 3602(b)(2) (exception for the employer's fraudulent concealment of the injury
or its relationship to employment). In such cases, the employer has the burden of proof
concerning apportionment of compensation between the original injury, which is exclusively
compensable under workers' compensation, and the aggravation of the injury, which is
compensable in tort. Id. See generally Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp.
193 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (case dealing with the employer's fraudulent concealment).
21. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(3) (vest 1989) (exception for certain defective products).
22. Id. § 4558 (exception for removal of safety guards). See generally Swanson v. Matthews
Prods., Inc., 175 Cal. App. 3d 901, 221 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1985) (case dealing with removal of
safety guards).
23. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3706 (West 1989) (exception for the employer's failure to secure
payment). See generally Lee v. Cranford, 107 Cal. App. 2d 677, 237 P.2d 986 (1951) (failure
of the employer to insure against the employee's injury).
24. See 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 922, sec. 4, at 3365 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600); id.
sec. 5, at 3366 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601); id. sec. 6, at 3367 (amending CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3602). See also Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation, 14 PAC. L.J. 763, 763
(1983) (discussion of Chapter 922). Prior to the 1982 amendments, many provisions of section
3602 were contained in Labor Code section 3601. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1751, sec. 1, at 3780
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for emotional distress one of the explicit exceptions to the exclusive
remedy provision is not clear. It has been suggested that the lack of
a specific exemption could be interpreted as foreclosing all civil
claims against employers for infliction of emotional distress. 2 This
view, however, has generally been rejected by the courts.2 6 Some
courts have held that a specific exemption is unnecessary, since prior
case law has recognized an implied exemption.27
The fact that an employer intentionally causes an injury to an
employee does not remove the injury from the ambit of the exclusive
remedy provision, unless the employer physically assaults the em-
ployee. 28 However, the Labor Code does provide some deterrence for
intentional injuries. 29 Under the Labor Code, serious or willful mis-
conduct by the employer allows the injured employee to collect one
and one-half times the normal compensation, together with costs and
expenses.30
Although the statutory basis of workers' compensation seems
straightforward, the workers' compensation provisions of the Labor
Code have been the subject of staggering amounts of litigation in
the California courts.3 1 Much of this litigation has centered on
application of the exclusive remedy provision.32 Of particular interest
and importance is the clash between the common law tort of inten-
(amending CAL. LA. CODE § 3601). Consequently, earlier decisions may cite the "exclusive
remedy" provision as section 3601.
25. See Comment, Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District: Exploring the Parameters
of the Normal Risks of Employment Test, 19 PAC. L.J. 303, 323 (1988) (discussion of the
possible interpretations of the legislature's actions).
26. See, e.g., Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1431, 235
Cal. Rptr. 68, 75 (1987) (legislature could not have intended to eliminate tort actions for
emotional distress, because to do so would leave employees who suffer emotional distress with
no remedy at all). See also Comment, supra note 25, at 323-25 (discussion of cases considering
whether the 1982 amendments eliminate tort claims against employers).
27. Id. See infra notes 84-101 (discussion of cases recognizing an implied exception).
28. See Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714 (1968) (the
fact that an injury is intentional does not, by itself, remove it from the exclusive remedy
provision). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 1989) (exception from the exclusive
remedy provision for willful physical assault by an employer).
29. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 156-57, 729 P.2d 743,
748, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1987) (the Labor Code provides a deterrence for employer's
intentional tortious acts). But see Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841,
147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (1978) (the Labor Code might not provide a sufficient deterrent to
intentional torts).
30. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989). Recoverable costs and expenses are limited to
$250. Id.
31. See generally Comment, Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful Termi-
nation Tort Damages: An Injurious Tug of War?, 39 HAsTiNos L.J. 1229 (1988) (discussion
of the history of workers' compensation litigation in California).
32. Id.
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1. Emotional Distress Generally
For more than ninety years, California has recognized a cause of
action for the infliction of emotional distress. 5 Modern California
law recognizes two types of emotional distress causes of action:
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.3 6 Both causes of action are responsible for
separate and distinct bodies of case law, with correspondingly distinct
requirements and elements.3 7
a. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Negligent infliction of emotional distress, (hereinafter NIED), is
further subdivided into two types of causes of action: direct actions
and bystander actions. The modern California view toward NIED
directly inflicted upon the plaintiff is stated in Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals." Overruling prior case law,39 the California
Supreme Court ruled in Molien that a plaintiff seeking recovery for
33. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (general discussion of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress in California).
34. See infra notes 79-188 and accompanying text (discussion of the viability of emotional
distress causes of action in the employment setting).
35. See, e.g., Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
Although the court recognized that mental suffering "constitutes an aggravation of damages
when it naturally ensues from the act complained of," the court held that emotional injury
must be accompanied by some physical injury to be compensable. Id.
36. See generally W.P. KEEToN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS at 359-67 (5th ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1988) (discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress); id. at 54-66 (discussion
of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
37. See infra notes 38-61 and accompanying text (discussion of negligent infliction of
emotional distress), notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussion of intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
38. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Sloane, 111 Cal. at 680, 44 P. at 322; Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 795-97, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 116-17 (1967) (physical manifestations are required
in order to state a cause of action). See also BAJI No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977) ("There can be
no recovery of damages for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury where such
emotional distress arises only from negligent conduct.").
1039
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emotional distress need not prove the existence of a physical injury. 0
The court stated that the physical injury requirement was created to
satisfy cynical views that the injury was not genuine.4' The court felt
that the physical injury requirement was disadvantageous because the
requirement prevented valid claims from reaching a jury, and because
the requirement encouraged extravagant pleading and distorted tes-
timony to allow claims to be filed.42 Under Molien, a plaintiff may
state a cause of action for direct NIED by proving that the emotional
distress was severe and foreseeable. 43 The court held that the severity
and foreseeability requirements would assure the genuineness of the
claim. 44 The court stated that an emotional injury is defined as severe
when it is the type that a normally constituted person could not
bear. 5
The Molien analysis is used only when the plaintiff alleges a
"direct" injury; in other words, that the result of the defendant's
negligence was directly inflicted on the plaintiff." A different analysis
is required when the plaintiff suffers "bystander" NIED. In by-
stander NIED, the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a result of
viewing an injury to a third person proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.47 The elements of the bystander NIED cause
of action have been radically altered by the courts over the last thirty
years.4
In the early 1960's, many states allowed a recovery for bystander
NIED when the plaintiff was in the "zone of danger," or, in other
words, was threatened with physical injury by the defendant's neg-
ligence. 49 These decisions held that recovery was proper because, by
placing the plaintiff in danger of physical injury, the defendant had
already breached the duty owed to the plaintiff.5 0 The zone of danger
40. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
43. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr at 838-39. For a more detailed discussion
of Molien, see generally Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981).
44. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
45. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (quoting Rodrigues v. State,
52 Haw. 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970)).
46. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
47. W.P. KE oN, supra note 36, at 365 (discussion of the bystander NIED cause of
action).
48. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text (disctssion of the history of bystander
NIED in California).
49. See W.P. KaroN, supra note 36, at 365 (discussion of the zone of danger test).
50. W.P. KEaToN, supra note 36, at 365.
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test was adopted in California in the early sixties,51 and continues to
be valid in some other jurisdictions.
52
In the landmark 1968 case of Dillon v. Legg,53 the California
Supreme Court discarded the zone of danger test.5 4 Instead, the court
held that three factors would be taken into account by courts to
determine if the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care: (1)
Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, as
opposed to a distance away; (2) whether the shock resulted from a
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as opposed
to learning of it later; and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim
were closely related. 5 The Dillon case attracted nationwide attention,
and its rationale was adopted in numerous other jurisdictions.
56
In a recent California Supreme Court case, Thing v. LaChusa,1
7
the court narrowed and modified the above "Dillon factors" and
ruled that they are not merely factors, but necessary elements of the
cause of action. In Thing, the court held that a plaintiff may recover
only if three elements are satisfied: (1) The plaintiff is closely related
to the injured victim; 8 (2) the plaintiff is present at the scene of the
injury and realizes that the victim is being injured;59 and (3) the
plaintiff suffers serious emotional distress as a result.
60
51. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 302-03, 379 P.2d 513,
517, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (1963) (adoption of the zone of danger test).
52. See W.P. KEETON, supra note 36, at 365 n.69; id. at 61 n.75 (1988 Supp.) (ist of
modern cases from Arizona, Minnesota, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin applying the
zone of danger test).
53. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
54. Id. at 739-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
55. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
56. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging
From Chaos, 33 HAsTiNGS L.J. 583, 584-85 (1982); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in Other States, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1248, 1253-57 (1974)
(discussions of the nationwide response to Dillon). For citation lists of out-of-state cases
adopting the Dillon test, see Nolan & Ursin, supra, at 585 n.9, and W.P. KEETON, supra note
36, at 366 n.74.
57. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
58. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court stated that, barring
unusual circumstances, recovery should be allowed only for parents, siblings, or children of
the victim, or relatives who reside in the victim's household. Id. at 668 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829
n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10.
59. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court maintained that allowing
those not physically present at the scene of the injury to state a cause of action would create
overly broad limitations on liability. Id. at 668 n.11, 771 P.2d at 829-30 n.11, 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 880-81 n.ll.
60. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. The court stated that serious
emotional distress arises when a reasonable person who is "normally constituted would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances." Id. at
668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.12 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156,
173, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970)).
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Bystander actions are extremely rare in the context of the subject
matter of this Comment. In one of those rare cases arising out of
employment, a court of appeals ruled that a cause of action for
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff who witnessed the fatal
work-related injury of her husband was barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Labor Code.61
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A completely different analysis is required when the emotional
distress is intentionally inflicted. For nearly forty years, California
has recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.6 2 Under present law, a plaintiff states a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress by first proving that the defendant
either acted with the intention of causing emotional distress, 63 or
with reckless disregard of the risk of causing the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress.6 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous, 6 that the emotional
distress is severe,66 and that the distress is proximately caused by the
defendant's behavior. 67 The plaintiff need not allege a physical in-
61. Williams v. Schwartz, 61 Cal. App. 3d 628, 634, 131 Cal. Rptr. 200, 203 (1976). See
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989) (exclusive remedy provision).
62. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952) (emotional distress as a result of coercive credit collection methods); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g, 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (employee suffered emotional
distress after his supervisor used racial epitaphs in firing him).
63. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, 2 Cal. 3d 493, 497-98, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88,
90.
64. Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 296, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547,
552 (1976) (reckless disregard of the risk may satisfy the intent requirement). See RESTATErENT
(SECOND) OF ToRts § 46 (1965) (discussion of the broader intent requirement for intentional
infliction of emotional distress as compared to other intentional torts).
65. Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 498-99, 468 P.2d at 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91. One court
held that, in order to meet the outrageous conduct element, a plaintiff must allege that:
(I) The defendant abused a relation or position which gives him power to damage
the plaintiff's interest, (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff was susceptible to
injury through mental distress, or (3) the defendant acted intentionally or unreason-
ably with the recognition that the acts were likely to result in illness through emotional
distress.
Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 297, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 553 (1976).
66. Newby, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 296, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Emotional distress is severe
if it is the sort that a normally constituted person would not be able to bear. Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928, 616 P.2d 813, 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-38
(1980).
67. Newby, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 296, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 553. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Or ToRTs § 46 (1965) (paralleling the California standard).
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jury.6 As with other intentional injuries, the defendant may be liable
for exemplary damages in proper cases . 9
2. Emotional Distress Claims Arising Out of Employment
a. Types of Injuries Which May Give Rise to a Tort Claim
The common law regarding emotional distress is well established
in California.70 Predictably, when emotional distress has arisen in the
employment context, conflicts between the common law and the
exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation have arisen.
7 1
A substantial body of case law attempting to resolve the issue exists
in California. 2 Plaintiffs who suffer employment related emotional
distress can only receive compensation if they are allowed to pursue
a tort claim, since the California courts traditionally view emotional
distress as a noncompensable injury under the workers' compensation
system. 7
3
In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,74 the plaintiff brought an action
against his employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
7 1
The plaintiff, who was black, alleged that he suffered emotional
distress, resulting in physical injuries, as a result of his supervisor's
racial slurs.7 6 In reversing the trial court's decision to sustain the
68. Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 498, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
69. Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 497 n.1, 468 P.2d at 218 n.1, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.1. See CAL.
Crv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989) (standards for exemplary damages).
70. See supra notes 38-69 and accompanying text (discussion of emotional distress actions
in California).
71. See infra notes 78-188 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987); Jenkins v. Family Health Program, 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (1989); Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 216 Cal. App. 3d 660, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 810 (1989); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447
(1978) (cases dealing with the conflict between the exclusive remedy provision and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
73. See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 839-40, 147 Cal. Rptr.
447, 450-51 (1978) (emotional distress is not compensable under workers' compensation). But
see 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 892, sec. 25, at 2683 (West) (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3)
(psychiatric injuries causing a mental disorder are compensable) (discussed infra notes 186-94
and accompanying text).
74. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
75. Id. at 496-97, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
76. Id. The supervisor allegedly stated, "You goddam 'niggers' are not going to tell me
about the rules. I don't want any 'niggers' working for me. I am getting rid of all the
'niggers'." Id.
1043
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defendant's demurrer, the California Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, because all of the common law elements of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action had been
satisfied. 77 The issue of the exclusivity of workers' compensation was
not raised by the parties.
78
In subsequent employment emotional distress cases, defendants
have raised the issue of workers' compensation exclusivity. 79 Since
physical injuries are covered under the workers' compensation system,
California courts have treated tort actions brought against employers
for purely emotional injuries differently than actions brought against
employers for the infliction of emotional distress combined with an
employment-related physical injury.80 For cases of purely emotional
harm, the California courts have generally allowed the employee to
bring a tort action.8 1 In cases against employers involving emotional
distress combined with physical illness or injury, most courts have
held that the existence of a physical injury triggers the exclusive
remedy provision, effectively barring any tort claim. 82
In many complaints alleging employment related emotional distress
filed after the Anbro case, the emotional distress was not accompa-
nied by physical injury.83 In the seminal case on the issue, Renteria
77. Id. at 498-99, 468 P.2d at 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91. See supra notes 63-67 and
accompanying text (discussion of the common law elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
78. At least two later appellate decisions permitted plaintiffs to state a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against their employers, without raising the issue
of the exclusivity of workers' compensation. See Agarwal v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 513,
146 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1978) (emotional distress caused by the employer's verbal abuse); Toney
v. State, 54 Cal. App 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976) (emotional distress caused by the
employer's threats and verbal abuse). For a discussion of the state of the law at the time of
these cases, see Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. Rv.
1, 9-21 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987); Jenkins, v. Family Health Program, 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (1989); Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 216 Cal. App. 3d 660, 264 Cal,
Rptr. 810 (1989); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447
(1978) (cases dealing with the conflict between the exclusive remedy provision and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
80. Compare Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (1979) (tort action for emotional distress accompanied by physical illness and
disability was barred by the exclusive remedy provision) with Renteria v. County of Orange,
82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (tort action for a purely emotional injury
may be brought).
81. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Young v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 214 Cal. Rptr.
400 (1985) (distress due to the employer's failure to discipline the plaintiff's co-worker for an
1044
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v. County of Orange,84 the plaintiff alleged that his employer sub-
jected him to surveillance and interrogations, treated him in a rude
and degrading manner, and discriminated against him because of his
Mexican descent, all for the purpose of causing him emotional
distress. 85 In the lower court, the defendant successfully demurred
on the ground that the plaintiff's emotional injuries were within the
workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision. 6 The trial court
determined that since the alleged injuries arose out of the course of
employment, the exclusive remedy provisions of Labor Code section
3602 applied, and thus a tort action was improper.
87
The appellate court in Renteria held that emotional distress, un-
accompanied by physical injury, is not a compensable injury under
the workers' compensation system. 88 Although the employer in Ren-
teria cited cases which, according to the employer, implied that
emotional distress was a compensable injury under the workers'
compensation system, the court maintained that those cases involved
other, nonemotional injuries, and thus were not controlling. 89 The
court recognized that classifying an injury as not compensable under
the workers' compensation system does not, by itself, abrogate the
exclusive remedy provision.9 The court noted that it may be necessary
to bar recovery for certain types of negligently or accidentally inflicted
injuries in order to further the policy of the continued efficient
operation of the workers' compensation system. 91
While acknowledging that courts in some other states have held
that the workers' compensation system provided the exclusive remedy
assault on the plaintiff); Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr.
696 (1983) (distress due to false imprisonment); McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891,
174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981) (distress due to harassment); Lagies v. Copely, 110 Cal. App. 3d
958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (distress due to defamation by employer); Renteria v. County
of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (distress due to verbal assaults,
interrogation, and ethnic discrimination).
84. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
85. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
86. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447.48.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 839-40, 147 Cal. Rptr. 450-51. The court stated that it was "aware of no
decisional or statutory authority for the proposition that mental suffering, as such, is a
compensable injury." Id. at 839, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 839-40, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (citing Baker v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.,
18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971)) (heart condition brought about by mental
strain of employment); Burnight v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5
Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960) (mental illness caused by job pressure).
90. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451. See Williams v. State
Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975) (the
absence of a compensable injury does not abrogate the exclusive remedy provision).
91. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 840-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
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for work-related injuries, even if they were noncompensable under
the workers' compensation system, 92 the appellate court in Renteria
found no support for such a proposition under California law. 93 The
court reasoned that to adopt such a proposition would bar recovery
for numerous civil wrongs that are outside the ambit of the workers'
compensation system, including many intentionally caused injuries. 94
The court then reasoned that the legislature could not have intended
for employees to lose their right to compensation for an entire class
of intentional civil wrongs, namely intentional infliction of emotional
distress .9-
Although the Labor Code provides for a penalty of fifty percent
of benefits for serious and willful misconduct by the employer, 96 the
court observed that the penalty provision does not provide a deterrent
for the intentional infliction of noncompensable injuries, since "50
percent of nothing is still nothing. ' 97 Consequently, the court held
that an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, unaccompanied by physical injuries, constituted an implied
exception to the exclusive remedy provision. 98 Under Renteria, a
plaintiff may bring a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against his employer so long as the essence of the tort is
nonphysical. 99 By recognizing a tort cause of action for purely
emotional injuries, the Renteria decision created an exception to a
later line of cases which held that emotional distress arising out of
92. Id. at 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451. See, e.g., Grice v. Suwanee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113
So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1959) (loss of a testicle); Moushon v. National Garages, 9
Ill. 2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842 (1956) (loss of both testicles); Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp. For
Women & Children, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552 (1920) (noncompensable neurological
injury). See generally 2 LARSON, LARsoN's WoRJMEN's CO.uENSAnTON § 65.20 (Desk ed. 1989)
(discussion of out-of-state cases barring tort recovery for noncompensable injuries). The
Renteria court observed that the theory underlying these decisions is that the workers'
compensation system imposes reciprocal concessions upon the employer and the employee:
While the employee enjoys speedy disposition of most claims, he or she gives up the right to
relief for certain injuries. These decisions hold that "a failure of the compensation law to
include some element of damage recoverable at common law is a legislative and not a judicial
problem." Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 840-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451 (quoting Williams v.
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975)).
93. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 840-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
94. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
95. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
96. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989) (increase of benefits by 50% for serious and
willful misconduct by the employer or the employer's agents resulting in injury to the employee).
See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussion of the Labor Code penalty
provision).
97. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
98. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
99. Id.
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employment was compensable only through workers' compensation.'00
The Renteria holding was followed in numerous subsequent cases.' 0'
Later cases raised the exclusive remedy issue in actions for emo-
tional distress combined with physical injuries. 0 2 Consideration of
the exclusive remedy provision in these cases provided a different
result than in Renteria. For example, in Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles
and Space Co.,103 an employee alleged that, as a result of managerial
harassment, he had suffered emotional distress leading to physical
illness and permanent disability.1 4 In the trial court, the defendant
successfully demurred on the grounds that a tort cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the exclusive
remedy provision." 5
On appeal, the employee contended that Renteria was controlling,
and that he was entitled to bring a tort claim. 1°6 The court distin-
guished Renteria on the basis of the existence of a compensable
physical injury. 0 7 The court stated that unlike the situation in Ren-
teria, the workers' compensation system offered the Ankeny plaintiff
a remedy. 08 The court then ruled that a tort action for emotional
distress accompanied by physical injury was barred by the exclusive
remedy provision.10 As a result, since emotional distress has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a noncompensable injury under California
workers' compensation law, and the plaintiff was barred from bring-
ing a tort action, the Ankeny decision meant that plaintiffs who
suffer emotional distress combined with physical injury must go
uncompensated for their emotional injuries. 10 Notwithstanding this
100. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text (cases determining that emotional
distress claims are within the exclusive remedy provision).
101. See supra note 83 (cases following Renteria).
102. See, e.g., Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (1979) (emotional distress and physical disability); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93
Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979) (emotional distress and neurological damage);
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1987) (emotional distress and stroke).
103. 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979).
104. Id. at 534, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
107. Id. at 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
108. Id. at 536, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
109. Id. at 535-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
110. See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 839-40, 147 Cal. Rptr.
447, 450-51 (1978) (emotional distress is a noncompensable injury under workers' compensa-
tion). But see Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 216 Cal. App. 3d 660, 667, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 810, 814 (1989) (workers' compensation awarded for an emotional injury, when the
employee suffered emotional distress and physical injury resulting in total disability).
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fact, subsequent California cases dealing with combined emotional
injuries and compensable physical injuries arising from employment
have, with very few exceptions, followed the Ankeny holding."'
Very few courts have allowed a plaintiff who suffered a combi-
nation of physical and emotional injuries to maintain a tort action.
The few cases in which the courts have allowed employees to maintain
a tort action for emotional distress accompanied by physical injury
involved physical injuries which, like emotional distress, were not
compensable under the workers' compensation system." 2 Only a bare
handful of cases have suggested, albeit in dicta, that a tort claim for
an emotional injury combined with a physical injury is allowable
when the gravamen of the complaint or the essence of the wrong is
emotional distress, and the physical injury is relatively minor com-
pared to the emotional distress."3 In one case in which the plaintiff
alleged emotional distress and physical injury, the court found the
allegation of physical injury to be superfluous makeweight, and
allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint to excise the allegation
of physical injury."
4
b. Determining Whether the Injury Arises Out of the Course of
Employment
The Renteria and Ankeny decisions purported to resolve the issue
of when an employment related tort claim for emotional distress can
be pursued. Until recently, however, a major question in the field
remained unresolved: Courts had not precisely defined the parameters
of what conduct arose "out of and in the course of" employment
for workers' compensation purposes. A recent California Supreme
111. See, e.g., Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 156, 729 P.2d 743,
747, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312-13 (1987); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d, 196,
204, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 491 (1979).
112. See, e.g., Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1983) (noncompensable loss of hearing combined with intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Lagies v. Copely, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (plaintiff alleged
that physical injury occurred from conduct by employer outside the scope of employment).
113. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987); Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 230, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 703 (1983).
114. McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895-98, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255-57 (1981).
But see Shoemaker v. Myers, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 792-93, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (1987)
(plaintiff could not amend his complaint to eliminate the allegations of physical injuries when
the elimination of the allegations was not properly explained), rev. granted, 740 P.2d 404, 239
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).
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Court case, Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist.,"s addressed this
and other issues. In Cole, the plaintiff, a firefighter employed by
the defendant, alleged that the defendant's agents had harassed him
and wrongfully demoted him." 6 As a result of the demotion and
harassment, the plaintiff suffered emotional distress and hyperten-
sion, resulting in a severe stroke which left him totally disabled."
7
In accord with prior case law,"8s the trial court sustained the defen-
dant's demurrer, ruling that emotional injury combined with physical
injuries were within the ambit of the exclusive remedy provision of
workers' compensation, and the court of appeals affirmed." 9
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued,
inter alia, that an exception to the exclusive remedy provision should
exist for an employer's intentional acts which aggravate an employ-
ment related injury. 20 The supreme court first emphasized the phys-
ical versus non-physical injury distinction, and distinguished the case
from the Renteria line of cases on the basis of Cole's physical
injuries.' 2 ' The court restated the rule from Ankeny and its progeny
that a tort claim for emotional distress could not be pursued when
the employee's emotional distress is accompanied by physical in-
jury.'2 The court reasoned that the justification for allowing tort
recovery in the case of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury is that such cases are not compensable under workers' com-
pensation, and failure to allow a tort action would mean that there
was no deterrent to intentional tortious conduct by employers. 2 The
court ruled that Labor Code section 4553 provided a deterrent for
the employer's acts that resulted in compensable injuries, by providing
for an increase in workers' compensation benefits for an employer's
"serious and willful misconduct."' 124
The court next considered whether demotion decisions causing
emotional injury arise "out of and in the course of" employment
115. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
116. Id. at 152-53, 729 P.2d at 744-45, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
117. Id. The plaintiff could no longer move or communicate, except by blinking. Id. at
153, 729 P.2d at 745, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
118. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
119. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 151, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
120. Id. at 159, 729 P.2d at 749, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
121. Id. at 155-56, 729 P.2d at 746-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 156-57, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
124. Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE. § 4553 (West 1989) (150q/ of normal benefits for serious
and willful misconduct by the employer).
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for workers' compensation purposes. 25 The court held that supervi-
sory acts such as demotions, promotions, employment negotiations,
and criticism of job performance were all a normal part of the
employment relationship, meaning that injuries arising from such
supervisory acts are within the ambit of the workers' compensation
system, and therefore within the exclusive remedy provision. 2 6 The
court reasoned that, in order to properly manage the business, most
employers must periodically criticize, demote, and discipline their
employees. 127 The court held that when an employee suffers emotional
distress leading to compensable disability, the employee is barred
from bringing a tort claim so long as the employer's misconduct
arises from a normal part of the employment relationship.2 8
The court did not state whether injuries resulting from the termi-
nation of employment arise out of the course of employment.2 9 Had
the Cole court intended to bar all tort claims arising out of termi-
nation, it probably would have done so explicitly, given the tremen-
dous impact such a holding would have on the huge body of
California case law concerning wrongful termination. 30 As discussed
in the next section of this Comment, some California appellate courts
attempted to resolve the issue in 1989."'
III. 1989 DEVELOPMENTS
A. Case Law
In 1989, the California Second District Court of Appeal appeared
to drastically alter the common law regarding employment related
emotional distress in Giorgi v. Verdugo Hills Hospital.32 The Giorgi
decision appeared to be a distinct departure from the Renteria line
125. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160-61, 729 P.2d at 751-52, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West 1989) (workers' compensation only applies when the injury arises
"out of and in the course of the employment").




130. See Comment, supra note 25, at 321-22 (such an interpretation of Cole would eviscerate
the law of wrongful termination).
131. See infra notes 132-88 and accompanying text (discussion of 1989 cases).
132. 210 Cal. App. 3d 252, 258 Cal. Rptr. 426 (2d Dist. 1989) (decertified pursuant to
California Rules of Court Rules 976 and 976.5 on November 6, 1989).
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of cases. 33 The impact of the case, at least as far as the case's
precedential value is concerned, was radically altered when the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court ordered the Giorgi opinion not published, on
November 2, 1989.134 As such, Giorgi may not be cited in California
courts. 35 However, the Giorgi case provides valuable insight as to
the direction in which California courts are headed, and is thus
meritorious of detailed discussion. Prior to its depublication, Giorgi
was followed by other California cases which have not been overruled
or depublished.
136
In Giorgi, the plaintiff, Amparo Giorgi, was hired by the defendant
hospital as the night housekeeping supervisor in June of 1980.137 The
plaintiff received a benefit package which included health insurance.
138
In November 1981, the plaintiff requested and was granted a leave
of absence to care for her daughter, who had undergone brain cancer
surgery. 139 After her return to work the following January, the
plaintiff's attitude changed, and she had several confrontations with
co-workers. "40 Soon after the plaintiff's return, the defendant gave
the plaintiff a written disciplinary notice which stated that her conduct
was unsatisfactory.1 41 The situation did not significantly improve
thereafter, and the defendant fired the plaintiff on June 30, 1982.142
The termination was in apparent violation of the defendant's stated
termination policy, which provided for two written warnings prior
to termination. 43
The plaintiff filed a complaint naming the hospital as defendant. 144
The complaint was amended several times in response to a series of
successful demurrers. 141 Ultimately, the complaint alleged three causes
of action arising out of her termination: (1) Breach of an implied
133. Compare supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text (discussion of Renteria and its
progeny) with infra notes 137-78 (discussion of the Giorgi holding).
134. Giorgi v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., 1989 W.L. 48727 (November 6, 1989) (depublication
order). See CA. R. CT. 976(c)(2) (West 1989) (the California Supreme Court may order an
opinion certified for publication not to be published).
135. See CA. R. CT. 977(a) (vest 1989) (an opinion not ordered published may not be
cited or relied on).
136. See infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (discussion of cases citing Giorgi with
approval).
137. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 260, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 260-61, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
141. Id. at 260, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
142. Id. at 261, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
143. Id. at 261, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
144. Id. at 261, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
145. Id.
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contract of permanent employment; (2) intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 46
Giorgi alleged that she had suffered emotional distress as a result
of her wrongful termination and the loss of her insurance benefits. 147
In the superior court, in 1986, the defendant moved for summary
adjudication of the emotional distress cause of action. 14 The defen-
dant argued that Cole should be interpreted as standing for the
proposition that an emotional injury resulting from termination is
exclusively compensable under workers' compensation. 149 Addition-
ally, the defendant claimed that the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act 50 (ERISA) precluded any claim for emotional distress
arising from a denial of health benefits.' The plaintiff conceded
that ERISA preempted a state court claim for denial of benefits.5 2
The court granted summary adjudication of the emotional distress
issue. 53 The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of
Appeal.
54
The court of appeal first observed that the recent judicial trend
has been to narrow the range of exceptions to the exclusive remedy
provision.'55 The court stated that narrowing the exceptions was
beneficial to both employers and employees, since doing so helped
to keep the workers' compensation system effective and cost-effi-
cient.- 6 The court did admit, however, that the exclusive remedy
provision bars only tort claims, and that, in a case in which a
plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of breach of
contract, the plaintiff may bring an action for breach of contract. 117
The court cited Cole to address the question of whether injuries
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 437c(f) (West Supp. 1989) (standards for motions
for summary adjudication).
149. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 261, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 429. See supra notes 125-29
(discussion of Cole holding regarding normal risks of employment).
150. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982) (ERISA provisions).
151. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 261-62, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
152. Id. at 262, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 429. ERISA provides extensive federal regulation of
termination of employment benefits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1348 (1982) (ERISA provisions
concerning termination of benefits).
153. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 264, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
156. Id. (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 156, 235
Cal. Rptr. 260 (1987)) (purpose of narrowing exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision).
157. Id. at 265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
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arising out of termination of employment arise "out of and in the
course of the employment" for workers' compensation purposes. 5 '
Although the Cole court did not specifically state that termination
was a necessary and inevitable part of employment, 5 9 the Giorgi
court concluded such a view was implicit in the Cole holding. 16° The
court reasoned that like hiring, demotion, and employee discipline,
termination is a day-to-day employment decision.' 6' The court be-
lieved that it was illogical to contend that at the time of the
employee's discharge, the employee was not "employed" for workers'
compensation purposes. 62 Injuries resulting from termination, the
court stated, are an inherent risk of employment, and therefore
injuries arising from termination arise out of employment. 63
The court then restated the Cole court's observation that there is
no general exception to the exclusive remedy rule for injuries that
are intentionally caused.'6 However, in an apparent contradiction of
Cole, 61 the court then extended the rule to cover all actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, regardless of whether the
emotional injury is accompanied by physical injury.'6 The court
noted that the result left plaintiffs such as Giorgi with no remedy,
but rationalized the result as a necessary trade-off to the right
conferred by the workers' compensation system to obtain swift
disposition of most injury claims without proving liability. 67 The
court implied that Giorgi's injury was too insignificant to be covered
under the workers' compensation system.
68
The Giorgi court held that the distinction between emotional
distress injuries with and without physical injury was no longer
valid, 69 and thus all emotional injuries were within the exclusive
158. Id. at 265-68, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 431-34. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1989)
(conditions of compensation).
159. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
160. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 266, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 267, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 433. The court believed that a contrary interpretation
would contravene the legislature's intent that workers' compensation statutes be liberally
construed in favor of compensation. Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1989).
163. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
164. Id. at 271, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 436. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text
(discussion of Cole).
165. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155-57, 729 P.2d 743,
747-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312-13 (1987) (the Renteria rationale is valid).
166. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
167. Id. at 270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
168. Id. The court stated that the legislature had viewed certain injuries as too insignificant
to trigger the workers' compensation provisions. Id.
169. Id. at 272-73, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37.
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remedy provision. 70 The court explicitly based its decision on Cole,
interpreting Cole as barring all employment related emotional distress
actions.' 7' Although the Cole opinion explicitly recognized the validity
of Renteria, the Giorgi court stated that, on the basis of Cole,
Renteria and its progeny were no longer valid. 172 The court also held
that the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was similarly barred
by the exclusive remedy provision, stating that all tort claims are
barred, "no matter what the labels of the causes of action seeking
them." 17
3
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Johnson, strongly
disagreed with the majority's reasoning, pointing out that since purely
emotional injuries are not compensable under workers' compensation,
such plaintiffs will have no recourse whatsoever against employers'
intentional acts. 74 The dissenting justice noted the majority's incon-
sistency with the Cole court's approval of Renteria and its progeny. 7 1
Justice Johnson felt that the Cole court had emphatically limited its
opinion to cases where the plaintiff had suffered a physical injury
or disability compensable under workers' compensation. 76 Corre-
spondingly, the fact that Giorgi's injury was not compensable under
the workers' compensation system mandated the allowance of her
tort claim. 77 Justice Johnson, citing Renteria, viewed the "trade-
off" rationale asserted by the majority as inappropriate, in that an
employer can completely escape liability for his or her intentional
misconduct.
78
Prior to the Supreme Court's order to depublish the case in
November of 1989, at least two California court of appeal cases
cited Giorgi with approval. 79 In the first case, Pichon v. Pacific Gas
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Compare id. ("plaintiff's reliance on [cases following Renteria] is misplaced in light
of Cole... after Cole, there is really nothing left of the physical/emotional injury dichotomy")
with Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 156-57, 729 P.2d at 747-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13 (recognition of
the Renteria exception to workers' compensation exclusivity).
173. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
174. Id. at 286, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
175. Id. at 288, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
176. Id. at 286, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). See Cole,
43 Cal. 3d at 156, 729 P.2d at 747, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13 (the exclusive remedy provision
is only applicable when the plaintiff has no substantial remedy under workers' compensation).
The Cole court appears to have limited its holding to cases in which the employee suffers
compensable disability. Id. at 159-60, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
177. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 286, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (Johnson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
178. Id. at 286-87, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
179. See Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Elect. Co., 212 Cal. App. 3d 488, 497, 260 Cal. Rptr.
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& Elect. Co., 80 the First District Court of Appeal stated that the
issue of whether the exclusive remedy provision only applied when
emotional distress was accompanied by a compensable physical injury
was left unanswered by Cole.' The court viewed Giorgi as answering
the question in the negative.182 The Pichon court found it unnecessary
to resolve the question, however, because the plaintiff had suffered
a compensable physical injury.
183
In another case, Jenkins v. Family Health Program,84 the plaintiff
alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the em-
ployer's wrongful termination of the plaintiff's employment.15 The
complaint did not allege a physical injury. 18 6 Nonetheless, the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to sustain
the defendant's demurrer. 187 The court completely ignored Renteria
and its progeny, and instead interpreted Cole and Giorgi as standing
for the proposition that all injuries actually arising out of employment
are barred by the exclusive remedy provision, regardless of whether
there is an injury compensable under workers' compensation.' As
of this writing (April, 1990), the Jenkins case has not been overruled
or depublished.
B. Legislative Changes in Workers' Compensation Law
In the 1989 session, the California legislature passed numerous
bills amending the workers' compensation provisions of the Labor
Code and adding new workers' compensation provisions. 189 The most
677, 683 (1989); Jenkins v. Family Health Program, 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 450, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 798, 803 (1989).
180. 212 Cal. App. 3d 488, 260 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1989).
181. Id. at 495, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
182. Id. at 488, 497, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
183. Id. at 495, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82.
184. 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 262 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1989).
185. Id. at 443, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
186. Id. at 443-44, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
187. Id. at 450, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
188. Id. at 449-50, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
189. See, e.g., 1989 Cal. Stat. chs. 461 (enacting Senate Bill 715), 507 (enacting Assembly
Bill 2380), 594 (enacting Senate Bill 1578), 827 (enacting Assembly Bill 323), 892 (enacting
Assembly Bill 276), 893 (enacting Senate Bill 47), 1165 (enacting Senate Bill 353), 1171 (enacting
Senate Bill 89), 1280 (enacting Senate Bill 804), 1369 (enacting Senate Bill 198). See generally
Note, Tackling Workers' Compensation In California: The Margolin-Bill Greene Workers'
Compensation Reform Act of 1989, 21 PAc. L.J. 853 (1990); Review of Selected 1989 California
Legislation, 21 PAc. L.J. 569, 571 (1990) (discussions of the 1989 amendments to the workers'
compensation system).
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sweeping of these enactments was Assembly Bill 276, which was
enacted as 1989 California Statutes Chapter 892 (hereinafter Chapter
892).' 90 While much of Chapter 892 concerns changes in the dollar
amounts of benefits, creation of rate boards, and the like, a few
provisions of the statute may have some effect on employment-
related emotional distress actions, although it will more likely be
applied to job-related stress, not the infliction of emotional distress. 9'
Chapter 892 expresses the legislature's intent to "establish a new
and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury.' ' 92
After the enactment of Chapter 892, a "psychiatric injury," for
which events of employment are at least ten percent responsible and
which causes disability or the need for medical treatment, is com-
pensable, so long as the injury is a "mental disorder."' 93 The statute
does not refer to "emotional distress," only to "mental disorders."
Chapter 892 requires that the diagnosis of a mental disorder be
expressed using the terminology of the third edition of the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (hereinafter DSM-II1). 194 The DSM-II is a nearly 500-page
volume describing a variety of organic, schizophrenic, paranoid, and
similar disorders. 95
The DSM-III states that a mental disorder is "conceptualized as a
clinically significant behavioral or psychologic syndrome or pattern,"
combined with "an inference that there is a behavioral, psychologic,
or biologic dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not only in the
relationship between the individual and society.' 1 96 This type of
injury, then, seems to be something more than ordinary emotional
distress, which the Restatement of Torts defines as "all highly
unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry,
and nausea.' ' 9 7
190. See 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 892 (enacting Assembly Bill 276).
191. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (discussion of effects of Chapter 892
on emotional distress actions).
192. 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 892, sec. 25, at 2683 (West) (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE §
3208.3(c)).
193. Id. (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(a)-(b)).
194. Id. sec. 23, at 2681 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.2(i)(4)).
195. See A~mEcAN PsycmAT'ic Ass'N, DIAoGNosTIc AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
196. Id. at 363. "When the disturbance is limited to a conflict between an individual and
society, this ... is not by itself a mental disorder." Id.
197. RE TATEmrNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
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IV. THE FuTur oF EMOTIONAL DIsmTEss AISING FRoM
EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA
While the explicit language of Chapter 892 expresses the legisla-
ture's intent to alter the compensability of psychological injuries,' 98
it seems unlikely that the new provisions will provide coverage under
workers' compensation for the vast majority of those who suffer
emotional distress. First, the distress is required to rise to the level
of a mental disorder, the definition of which suggests a higher
standard than that of common-law emotional distress.19 Second, the
DSM-III warns physicians that a high suspicion of "malingering,"
rather than a mental disorder, should be aroused when the patient
visits the physician in the context of a potential legal claim, partic-
ularly when the patient is referred to the physician by an attorney. 2°°
In sum, it seems unlikely that Chapter 892 is applicable to employees
who suffer emotional distress, except for those who suffer emotional
distress so severe that it leads to a mental disorder categorized in the
DSM-III. Chapter 892 will more likely apply to those employees who
suffer stress due to the pressures of their jobs.
201
As discussed above, case law in the area of employment related
emotional distress is far from clear. A fair inference, judging from
cases such as Ankeny, Cole, Giorgi, and Jenkins, is that the trend
over the past ten years has been to restrict the availability of tort
remedies to employees suffering from emotional distress. 202 How far
this trend will be carried is difficult to predict.
Prior to the depublication order, the Giorgi opinion was binding
on the courts of the Second Appellate District, and was persuasive
authority for all other California appellate courts. An opinion which
has been ordered not published, however, may not be cited as
198. 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 892, sec. 25, at 2683 (West) (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE §
3208.3(a)).
199. Compare DSM-III, supra note 195, at 363 (definition of mental disorder) with
RESTATE mNT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 46 comment j (1965) (definition of emotional distress).
200. DSM-III, supra note 195, at 331.
201. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App.
3d 308, 316-17, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304, 309 (1982) (stress is a compensable injury under workers'
compensation so long as employment was influential in creating or aggravating the injury).
See generally Duckworth, Workers' Compensation: Expanding Areas, 23 TORT & INs. L.J.
478 (1988) (courts are beginning to recognize workers' compensation claims for job-related
stress).
202. See supra notes 115-88 and accompanying text (discussion of recent cases narrowing
employee tort causes of action).
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precedent in any California court23° The reasoning used in Giorgi
and Jenkins suggests that all tort claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising out of employment situations, including
those arising from wrongful termination, should be barred.20, If the
California courts accept the doctrines of such cases, future cases may
spell an end to the tort cause of action for employment related
infliction of emotional distress in California.
The language of Giorgi, however, is more far-reaching. The Giorgi
opinion states that all tort claims arising out of employment are
subject to the exclusive remedy provision? °s Dictum in a more recent
court of appeal opinion, Panopulos v. Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration,-1 seems to be in accord. 207 In the past, California decisions
have indicated that plaintiffs may successfully pursue other tort causes
of action against employers, such as defamation. 28 By extension,
future decisions similar to Giorgi could preempt such causes of action
through the exclusive remedy provision. Members of the legislature
reacted to opinions such as Giorgi and Jenkins with a bill which
would specifically create an exception to the exclusive remedy pro-
vision for intentionally inflicted injuries. 209 This bill, however, died
in committee. 210
The California Supreme Court has granted review of another case,
Shoemaker v. Myers,21' in which the lower court ruled that an
emotional injury with physical manifestations was ruled to be barred
by the exclusive remedy provision.2 2 In Shoemaker, the plaintiff
originally alleged physical injuries, and the defendant successfully
203. See CAL. R. CT. 977(a) (West 1989) (depublication prohibits an opinion from being
cited in court). In a civil action, unpublished opinions may only be cited or relied on "when
the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel." Id. 977(b).
204. See supra notes 165-71, 180-88 and accompanying text (discussion of the possible
elimination of tort causes of action for employer-inflicted emotional distress).
205. Giorgi, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
206. 216 Cal. App. 3d 660, 264 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1989).
207. Id. at 668, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 815. The court stated that "any damages based on
plaintiff's injuries while he remained on the job are ... barred," Id.
208. See Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 288 (1983)
(recognition of a defamation cause of action arising from wrongful termination). See also
Comment, supra note 31, at 1247-48 (discussion of defamation causes of action for wrongful
termination).
209. See Assembly Bill 208 (Floyd, 1989) (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602).
210. 1989-90 REGuLAR SEssIoN AssamBLY REcEss HISTORY, at 161 (October 3, 1989).
211. 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1987), rev. granted, 740 P.2d 404, 239
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).
212. Id. at 792, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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demurred on the basis of the exclusive remedy provision. 213 The
plaintiff then attempted to amend his complaint to eliminate the
allegation of physical injuries, but the trial court found that the
plaintiff did not adequately explain the deletions, and therefore
treated the complaint as if the physical injury allegations had not
been deleted. 2 4 The Shoemaker case, then, is not precisely on point
with the Giorgi and Jenkins opinions. However, the case may provide
the California Supreme Court with an opportunity to set down rules
for the lower courts concerning many of the confusing issues dis-
cussed in Parts II and III of this Comment. Without a doubt, the
last word on the issue has not been spoken. The issue will likely
remain cloudy until either the legislature or the California Supreme
Court addresses it in the future.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY
If holdings such as those in Giorgi and Jenkins become universally
accepted in California, injured employees will be absolutely barred
from any recovery for intentionally caused emotional injuries arising
from employment.215 Additionally, such holdings provide no deterrent
to intentional infliction of emotional distress by employers.
Even under the well-established Ankeny reasoning, a curious anom-
aly exists: Employees who suffer only emotional injury, which does
not lead to physical harm, may maintain an action in tort, while
plaintiffs who suffer emotional distress so severe that debilitating
physical manifestations result are limited to workers' compensation
coverage for the physical harm, with no compensation for the emo-
tional harm, unless the conduct results in a mental disorder. 216 This
situation will often allow employers who commit the most egregious
acts to escape with only limited liability, and seems inconsistent with




214. Id. at 792-93, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
215. Of course, if the injuries are the result of a willful physical assault, they are outside
the ambit of the exclusive remedy provision. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 1989).
216. See, e.g., Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal 3d. 148, 153, 729 P.2d 743,
745, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (1987) (emotional distress led to plaintiff's total paralysis, leaving
the plaintiff incapable of communication except through blinking, yet plaintiff's tort claim
was barred by the exclusive remedy provision).
217. See generally W.P. Keeton, supra note 36, at 25-26 (discussion of the public policy
goal of discouragement of the commission of torts).
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A. Proposal: Creation of an Explicit Exception to the Exclusive
Remedy Provision for Injuries Intentionally Caused by the
Employer
In Williams v. State Compensation Insurance Fund,28 a California
court of appeal stated that any failure of the workers' compensation
system to provide benefits for a class of injuries is a legislative and
not a judicial problem. 21 9 In light of Williams and the conflicting
decisions of the California courts, the confusion over employment
related emotional distress claims is best resolved by legislative enact-
ment. During the 1989 session of the legislature, Assembly Bill 208
(hereinafter A.B. 208) was proposed to amend the exclusive remedy
provision of the Labor Code. Under A.B. 208, the exclusive remedy
provision would not have applied "[w]here the employee's injury is
proximately caused or aggravated by the employer's conduct that
exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society and where
the employer acted deliberately for the purpose of injuring the
employee."2 0 Although the bill died in committee, it was a two-year
bill and was thus eligible for reconsideration by the 1990 legislature.2 21
The 1990 legislature failed to pass the bill.222
Such a proposal, while certainly a step in the right direction as
far as injured employees are concerned, is no panacea for the problem
of adequately compensating victims of emotional distress inflicted by
employers. This legislation would likely allow a tort remedy for the
most reprehensible instances of conduct by employers, those which
exceed all bounds of decency. In such a case, a defendant would
likely be liable for punitive damages.223 The likelihood of having to
pay out both compensatory and punitive damages would possibly
deter some intentionally harmful behavior on the part of employers.2 4
218. 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
219.- Id. at 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
220. 1990 Assembly Bill 208, sec. 1 (Floyd) (as introduced) (amending CAL. LAB. CODE §
3602).
221. 1989-90 REGULAR SESSION AsSEmLY REcESS HISTORY at 161 (October 3, 1989).
222. 1990 AssMLY WEEKLY HISTORY, MARCH 1, 1990, at 90. The bill died in committee.
Id.
223. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (West 1989) (defendants are liable for exemplary damages
for willful, despicable conduct).
224. See generally DOBBS, HANDBOOiK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIS 205-11 (1973) (punitive
damages are generally viewed as not compensatory, but to punish the defendant and to deter
repetition of the behavior).
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However, a statute such as the one proposed by A.B. 208 would still
permit courts to bar certain emotional distress actions which would
be actionable in tort if not employment related. Through narrow
judicial interpretation of the demanding requirements of the language
of A.B. 208, courts might bar otherwise actionable claims.
A.B. 208 allows an employee to avoid the exclusive remedy pro-
vision only if the employer acts "deliberately.' ' 22 As discussed in
Part II of this Comment, 226 under the generally recognized California
law of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant may
be liable when he or she acts without actual intent to injure the
plaintiff, but with reckless disregard of the risk that the plaintiff will
suffer emotional distress.227 The disparity in the intent requirements
between A.B. 208 and the common law would certainly mean that
some plaintiffs who would be able to bring a tort action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress under common law, but for
the fact that the distress was inflicted in the course of employment,
will ultimately remain uncompensated. Furthermore, the narrow in-
tent requirement of A.B. 208 would also exclude a tort cause of
action for employment related negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.228
A possible solution to the controversy surrounding the intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of employment is for the
legislature to amend the Labor Code to exempt all intentional torts
from the exclusive remedy provision. California would not be the
first state to amend its laws to exempt intentional acts from the
exclusive remedy provision. Prior to 1987, Michigan's exclusive rem-
edy provision contained language nearly identical to the language of
California's exclusive remedy provision: "The right to recovery of
benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive
remedy against the employer." 229 The Michigan courts found that
workers' compensation provided a remedy for both physical and
225. 1990 Assembly Bill 208, sec. 1 (Floyd) (as introduced) (amending CAL. LAB. CoDn §
3602).
226. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
227. Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552
(1976) (broader intent requirement for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
228. See supra notes 38-61 and accompanying text (discussion of common law tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
229. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West 1985) (amended by 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts
28, § 1). Compare id. with CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (Vest 1989) ("Where the conditions of
compensation ... concur, the right to recover such compensation is ... the sole and exclusive
remedy of the employee and his or her dependents against the employer").
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emotional injuries, so long as the injury was "disabling." 2 30 As such,
some emotional distress cases were viewed as within the exclusive
remedy provision. 231 For cases of emotional distress not compensable
under workers' compensation, however, Michigan allowed a tort
action to be maintained. 32
In 1987, the Michigan legislature amended the Michigan exclusive
remedy provision to read:
The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall
be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a
personal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this
exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall
exist only when an employee is injured as a result of the deliberate
act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury.
An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the
employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur
and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an
act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court.
This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law.23
The state of Arizona has adopted a similar standard in the Arizona
exclusive remedy provision.2
34
The new Michigan statute, if adopted in California, would allow
most employees injured by their employers' intentional infliction of
emotional distress to maintain a tort action, particularly if the
California legislature altered the intent requirement of the Michigan
statute to incorporate the broader intent requirement of the California
common law regarding emotional distress.2Y5 This could be accom-
230. Kissinger v. Mannor, 92 Mich. App. 572, 285 N.W.2d 214, 216-17 (citing Diezel v.
Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d I (1978) and Milton v. Oakland County,
50 Mich. App. 279, 213 N.W.2d 250 (1973)) (only disabling injuries are compensable under
workers' compensation).
231. 285 N.W.2d at 216.
232. Id. at 217. In Kissinger, the court also strained to find the employer's behavior as
outside the scope of employment, thus removing it from the ambit of the exclusive remedy
provision. In that case, the plaintiff, a General Motors employee, requested that his supervisor
temporarily replace him on the assembly line so that he could use the men's room. Id. at 215.
The supervisor failed to do so, and the employee had a bowel movement in his clothing. Id.
After the employee received permission to go home and change his clothing, his supervisor
informed approximately 40 co-workers that the plaintiff had "crapped his pants" at work.
Id. The plaintiff alleged that this disclosure subjected him to ridicule and caused emotional
distress. Id. The court found that the supervisor's act was outside the scope of employment.
Id. at 217.
233. Mic. Comp. LAws. ANN. § 418.131(1) (West Supp. 1989).
234. See ARuz. RE,. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1989) (exception to the exclusive remedy
provision for acts done purposefully with the direct intent of injuring the employee).
235. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussion of the broader intent requirement
for intentional infliction of emotional distress encompassing reckless behavior).
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plished by adopting language similar to that in Louisiana's exclusive
remedy provision: "Nothing in [the exclusive remedy provision] shall
affect ... the [employer's] liability, civil or criminal, resulting from
an intentional act. ' 236 Fears of the courts being clogged by nonmer-
itorious emotional distress claims should be allayed by the Michigan
statute's provision that the determination of whether the employer's
act is intentional is a question of law for the judge. This provision
should allow frivolous claims to be disposed of by demurrer.
23 7
Adoption of a statute similar to those passed in Michigan, Arizona,
or Louisiana would in all likelihood have the additional benefit of
deterring intentional and outrageous conduct by employers resulting
in the infliction of emotional distress upon employees. Unlike the
present law in California, employers would not be able to completely
escape liability for the infliction of emotional distress merely because
the employee suffers a compensable physical injury.
California courts could accomplish the same objective by inter-
preting the legislature's intent in creating the workers' compensation
system as preserving a tort action for employees injured by their
employers' acts. Although the exclusive remedy provisions of
Connecticut 238 and Illinois29 do not explicitly exempt employers'
intentional acts, courts in those states have, through judicial inter-
pretation, created exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions for
intentional acts.3 In the past, California courts have not interpreted
the workers' compensation provisions in this way, and it seems
unlikely they will do so in the future. 241 Since the exclusive remedy
provision explicitly creates an exception for willful assaults by an
employer, but not other willful acts, it could certainly be argued
236. LA. REv. STAT. Am. § 23:1032 (West 1985) (exclusive remedy provision). See generally
Comment, The Intentional Act Exception To The Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation, 44
LA. L. REv. 1507 (1984) (discussion of the Louisiana legislature's amendment of the exclusive
remedy provision to exempt intentional torts and its effect on Louisiana case law).
237. See CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE §§ 430.10-.30 (West 1973 & Supp. 1990) (provisions for
demurrer).
238. See CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 31-284 (West 1987) (exclusive remedy provision).
239. See ILL. AN. STAT ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986) (exclusive remedy
provision).
240. See Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 491 A.2d 368, 375 (1985) (the exclusive
remedy provision may be bypassed by showing that the employer's act was intentional);
McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714, 716 (S.D. 11. 1978) (intentional
torts are risks of employment not contemplated by the workers' compensation system).
241. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714 (1968)
(the fact that an employer's acts are intentional does not create an exception to the exclusive
remedy provision).
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that, through negative implication, the legislature did not intend to
exempt all intentional acts. 2
B. Alternative Proposal: Explicit Inclusion of Emotional Distress
in Those Injuries Compensable Under Workers' Compensation
An additional alternative is to either legislatively or judicially
provide workers' compensation benefits for emotional distress arising
from employment. This solution would allow some compensation to
plaintiffs. Although, in all likelihood, the average plaintiff would
receive a lesser settlement under workers' compensation than through
a tort claimy 3 allowing plaintiffs to collect for emotional distress
under workers' compensation would further the legislative goal that
the workers' compensation system provide swift disposition of an
injured employee's claims without forcing the employee to prove
fault. 4
Under the present California Labor Code, the workers' compen-
sation system covers any injury sustained by an employee arising out
of the course of employmentY'5 The Labor Code does not exclude
emotional injuries from the definition of the term "injury;" in fact,
the term is defined rather broadly as any injury or disease arising
out of employment.24 Despite the fact that emotional distress is not
explicitly excluded from the definition of the term "injury" for
workers' compensation purposes, California courts have universally
held that emotional distress is a noncompensable injury under work-
ers' compensation.27
Other states have interpreted their statutes differently. As discussed
above, the Michigan courts have interpreted statutes similar to Cal-
ifornia's as allowing a claim for emotional distress under workers'
242. See CA,. LAn. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 1989) (exclusion from the exclusive remedy
provision for intentional physical assaults by employers).
243. For example, although the amount of potential punitive damages are unlimited for
tort claims, they are limited to 50% of compensation benefits for workers' compensation.
Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989) (assessment of punitive damages in tort
cases) with CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989) (assessment of punitive damages in workers'
compensation cases).
244. See Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 612 P.2d
948, 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980) (discussion of the statutory intent of the workers'
compensation provisions).
245. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West 1989).
246. Id. § 3208.
247. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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compensation, in some situations. 248 In Wyoming, an "injury" for
workers' compensation purposes is defined as "any harmful change
in the human organism other than natural aging." 9 The Wyoming
Supreme Court ruled that emotional injuries are compensable injuries
under that statute, so long as the plaintiff proves that such injury
was caused by stress greater than that arising from normal working
conditions.70 Wisconsin has recognized a similar rule.21
The California courts could ensure that plaintiffs receive some
compensation by interpreting the workers' compensation provisions,
as other states have, as providing coverage for all emotional injuries
arising out of the scope of employment. The failure of the courts to
do so up to this point reflects an outmoded manner of thinking:
that emotional injuries are not valid injuries.2 2 For purposes other
than workers' compensation, of course, emotional distress has long
been recognized as a valid injury.2
3
In reality, there is little or no likelihood that the California Supreme
Court will be inclined to overrule the substantial body of case law
holding that emotional distress is not compensable under the Cali-
fornia Labor Code. Additionally, in light of the legislature's recent
passage of Chapter 892, the court may feel that the legislature has,
by failing to include the term "emotional distress" in Chapter 892,
declared that emotional distress should not be compensable under
workers' compensation. For these reasons, the California legislature
should clarify this area of the law. The legislature should amend the
definition of a compensable injury under the workers' compensation
provisions to explicitly include emotional distress. Perhaps this is
what the legislature was attempting to do in enacting Chapter 892 in
1989, but it is highly unlikely that most emotional distress will fall
within the definition of a mental disorder as provided by Chapter
892. Including all emotional distress claims within the workers'
compensation system would have three distinct benefits: (1) Employ-
ees would be compensated for the on-the-job emotional distress they
248. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
249. Wyo. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xii) (1987).
250. Graves v. Utah Power & Light, 713 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1987) (each situation must
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis).
251. See Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Dept. of Indust., Labor, & Health Relations, 72 Wis. 2d
46, 240 N.W.2d 128, 130 (1976) (the mail order business during the Christmas season determined
to be particularly stressful).
252. See W.P. KEETON, supra note 36, at 360-61 (discussion of the reluctance of early
twentieth century courts to recognize emotional distress as a compensable injury).
253. See supra notes 38-69 and accompanying text.
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suffer, without the employer and the employee being forced to endure
lengthy and costly litigation; (2) employers would be deterred from
intentionally inflicting emotional distress on their employees; and (3)
the burden on the court system would be lessened slightly by diverting
cases from the courts to the workers' compensation board.
CONCLUSION
The current state of the law concerning employer-inflicted emo-
tional distress is far from ideal. Currently, employees whose emo-
tional distress leads to physical injury are barred from bringing tort
claims against their employers, regardless of how reprehensible the
employers' conduct may be. This artificial result encourages bizarre
pleadings and even more bizarre results. Recent cases suggest that
even an employee who suffers a purely emotional injury may not
bring a claim of any kind and will receive absolutely no compensa-
tion, while the employer who sets out to emotionally cripple the
employee incurs absolutely no liability. Even courts which have helped
shape this area of the law have conceded that such a result seems
completely inconsistent with the legislature's intent in creating the
workers' compensation system.2 4
The basic goal of tort law is to ensure that injured parties are
adequately compensated for their injuries.25 The current law plainly
does not accomplish this goal. Remedial measures should be taken
with this purpose of tort law in mind. This goal could most efficiently
be accomplished by the courts or the legislature explicitly allowing a
tort action for work related intentionally inflicted emotional distress
claims regardless of whether the emotional injury is accompanied by
physical injury. The goal could also be accomplished, but, due to
the lower rate of compensation, less completely, by explicitly includ-
ing emotional distress within the class of injuries contemplated by
the workers' compensation system.
Until this issue is resolved, little will be certain in this area of the
law. Until the courts or the legislature speak, however, a few pred-
ictions seem safe to make: Many injured plaintiffs will remain
uncompensated; many employers will completely escape liability for
254. See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841, 147 Cal. Rptr.
447, 451 (1978).
255. See W.P. KETroN, supra note 36, at 5-6 (description of the basic function of tort
law).
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their intentionally injurious acts; and nobody will be able to say for
sure what the law is.
Joseph Zuber
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